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Abstract
Resource-Competitive Consensus and Leader Election Tolerating Jamming
Jianyu Wang
Advisor: Maxwell Young, Ph.D.
In this paper, we present randomized, distributed algorithms that allow n ≥ 1 nodes
to solve agreement problems in a single-hop, time-slotted wireless sensor network
(WSN). In particular, we consider the problem of consensus — where all nodes must
come to agreement on any single value — and the problem of leader election — where
all nodes must agree on a single node to act as a leader.
Both consensus and leader election are well-studied challenges whose solutions pro-
vide critical building blocks for protocols in distributed systems. Our results extend this
study to the domain of WSNs in the presence of (possible malicious) communication
failures. Our algorithms are provably robust and scalable in the face of an adversary
who interferes with (or jams) communications between the network devices (nodes).
In WSNs, the communication costs incurred by nodes is a major concern because
such devices are typically powered by on-board batteries with limited resources, and the
actions of sending and listening on the communication channel dominates operational
costs. These costs are modeled as a unit cost for sending or listening to a message in
a single time slot, while the cost for staying silent in a time slot is zero. Similarly, the
adversary incurs unit cost to jam a single slot as this equates to sending on the channel.
Consider an adversary that incurs a cost of T by pursuing an arbitrary, worst-case
jamming strategy. We demonstrate an algorithm that solves consensus, and another al-
gorithm that solves leader election, with a per-node expected cost of O(
√
T/n lg2.5 n+
lg5 n). This implies that the adversary must incur a substantially large asymptotic cost in
pursuing any jamming strategy. In the energy-constrained domain of WSNs, this result
is particularly valuable as the adversary will rapidly deplete her resources in attempting
to thwart consensus or leader election.

11. Introduction
1.1 Background
Consensus and leader election are well-studied problems since they provide crit-
ical functionality for many applications in distributed systems. For example, agree-
ment among sensor devices plays a role in firefighting [1], mapping of the ocean floor
[42], planning in swarm robotics [13], and localization in decentralized wireless net-
works [16]. Leader election makes substantial optimization, particularly with respect to
energy savings, possible when a single device coordinates the actions of other devices
within local broadcast region [9, 33].
Unfortunately, the shared wireless medium gives rise to challenges concerning reli-
able communication. A device (or node) that suffers a hardware or software fault may
behave in a fashion that causes interference on the channel. For example, such a node
may not execute a medium access control (MAC) protocol correctly. In more severe sit-
uations, an attacker who controls one or more nodes may deliberately attempt to inter-
fere with communications by emitting high-energy noise on the channel [4, 11, 58, 59].
Such an attack is easily launched given the open nature of the wireless medium, and it
is an effective denial-of-service (DoS) attack in the wireless domain.
Exacerbating the problem is the “energy-starved” nature of WSNs where nodes are
typically equipped with a small on-board battery. For example, commercially available
devices manufactured by by Crossbow [19] and Dust Networks [24] are powered by a
pair of AA batteries. Future designs, such as SPECKNET [54], call for even smaller
batteries as the miniaturization of devices is pursued. Attempting to defend against a
jamming attack by more aggressively sending or listening on the channel will result in
nodes depleting their energy supply. For many potential deployments, such as surveil-
lance in dangerous terrain, replacing the on-board battery is not possible.
Given this concern, we study the consensus and leader election problems in wireless
2networks in the presence of a jamming adversary. Our work focuses on developing
algorithms to solve consensus and leader election in networks where the devices are all
within the communication range of each other (a single-hop network). Our algorithms
have the property that the cost incurred by correctly functioning nodes is substantially
less than the cost incurred by malfunctioning or adversarial devices. A recent approach
to algorithm design, known as resource competitiveness, addresses this issue.
1.2 Overview
In this section, we summarize the approach of designing resource-competitive algo-
rithms. Additionally, we specify our network model, and provide formal definitions of
the consensus and leader election problems.
1.2.1 Resource Competitiveness
Resource competitiveness was first proposed in [30] and has featured in robust com-
munication algorithms [20,21,29,36]. In almost all of the literature on robust distributed
computing, it is assumed that malicious nodes have no cost for attacking. However, in
WSNs, this assumption is overly-pessimistic since disrupting the communication chan-
nel requires that an attacker spend energy on jamming.
Given that energy costs are a concern for both correct (good) nodes and malicious
(bad) nodes, we can measure the performance of an algorithm by analyzing on the
relative cost between the good and bad nodes. If the cost to the bad nodes grows dispro-
portionately faster, the attack cannot be sustained as it will quickly deplete the on-board
energy supplies of the bad nodes. Resource competitiveness provides the algorithmic
definitions to formalize this general approach.
We assume the malicious nodes can collude and cooperate with one another to
launch their attacks on the system. To this end, a single adversary is assumed to control
and coordinate the actions of all bad nodes in any arbitrary (worst-case) fashion.
Consider any distributed algorithm A. Let Cost(α, q) denote the resource expendi-
3ture (or cost) to a node q over an execution α of A. A resource might be bandwidth,
CPU cycles, energy, actual money, or any other useful measure. If q is good, then
Cost(α, q) is the cost incurred by q for executing the actions prescribed by A in an
execution α. Otherwise, q is faulty and Cost(α, q) is the cost incurred by q for pursuing
any arbitrary strategy in an execution α. The membership of good nodes and bad nodes
are not necessarily known to A a priori.
Let T (α) =
∑
q ∈ B Cost(q) be the total cost of the adversary. The value of T may
be unknown to the good nodes. We simply refer to T and Cost(q) since α is implicit
in both terms. With this terminology in hand, we can define what it means for A to be
resource competitive:
Definition 1. (Resource competitive algorithm) A is (ρ, τ )-resource competitive if
maxq ∈ G{Cost(q)} ≤ ρ(T ) + τ for any α and τ > 0.
Definition 1 states that A is resource competitive if the maximum cost incurred by any
good node is less than some function of the total cost incurred by the adversary, ρ(T ),
plus some additive term τ .
The function ρ is called the robustness function and it is a function of T and possibly
other parameters. A small ρ is useful as it implies that the cost incurred by good nodes
for executing A is asymptotically smaller than what the adversary incurs. The function
τ is the energy cost function when there is no jamming attacks.
It useful to explicitly separate the cost ofA into the component which is parameter-
ized by T , and the component which is not. Throughout this document, we will often
report resource-competitive performance using big-O notation of the form O(ρ(T )+ τ)
1.2.2 Our Network Model
We assume a synchronous, single-hop network with a single communication chan-
nel. Time is discretized into fixed-length time slots (or just slots), and each slot can be
characterized as follows. First, in the case where the adversary jams in the slot, then that
slot is said to be jammed or noisy. Any good node that listens in that slot will receive
4only unintelligible noise. Second, if the slot is not jammed, it can be characterized as
follows:
• Clear Slot: If there is no node sending a message in a slot, then the slot is clear.
Any correct node that listens to the channel in this slot will hear silence.
• Useful Slot: If exactly one node sends a message in a slot, the slot is useful. Any
correct node that listens to the channel in this slot will hear the information being
transmitted during this slot.
• Noisy Slot: If two or more nodes send a message in a single slot, then that slot
is noisy. This is typically referred to as a message collision. A correct node that
listens to the channel in this slot will receive only unintelligible noise.
When a node u hears a noisy slot, we assume u cannot differentiate between the cases
where this noise was caused by jamming or if it was caused by two good nodes sending
at the same time.
The cost for sending or listening on the channel is 1 per slot. Otherwise, the node
is assumed to be in an energy-efficient sleep state and the cost is zero for that slot.
The assumption that a node incurs zero cost in a time slot if it stays silent is based
on the observation that the operational costs are dominated by the use of the on-board
radio [48].
1.2.3 Jamming Adversary
As described above, the adversary represents the entire set of bad nodes in the sys-
tem. When the adversary jams a slot, all nodes hear noise in that slot if they are listening
to the channel. That is, all nodes will hear the same thing if they are listening. In the lit-
erature, such an adversary is called 1-uniform and this is a popular model [8,29,50–52].
This is in contrast to an adversary who, in a single slot, jams such that only some sub-
set of good nodes hear the jamming. Such adversaries are said to be n-uniform and
5the results in this document do not address this type of adversarial jamming (see the
discussion in Section 4.2).
We assume that the adversary can jam transmissions rendering the content on the
channel unintelligible to any listening good node. However, the adversary cannot spoof
good nodes or inject messages of its own. That is, we restrict our focus to jamming
faults. This is in contrast to crash failures and Byzantine faults that have been consid-
ered previously [40, 56] (again, see the discussion in Section 4.2).
In accordance with Kerckhoffs’s principle [34], the adversary is assumed to have
complete knowledge of our algorithm specification except for any random bits that are
generated by the nodes themselves. We assume that nodes have the capability to gener-
ate random (or pseudo-random) bits and use these in the execution of our algorithm.
In the network model, there are three general types of jamming adversaries [12,
57, 59]: oblivious, adaptive and reactive adversaries. The oblivious adversary jams the
channel independent of any knowledge of what the correct nodes are doing. The adap-
tive adversary knows the history of what all nodes have done (in terms of, say, sending
and listening) prior to the current slot, and can use this information to plan its action (to
jam or not) in the current slot. Finally, the reactive adversary is the most powerful type.
A reactive adversary possibly knows all details like an adaptive adversary. Moreover it
can detect a transition and then jam the medium immediately [57]. An obvious chal-
lenge is that a reactive adversary can simply jam every slot that is useful, and thus carry
out a highly efficient DoS attack. We do not treat reactive adversaries in this document;
however, we discuss the implications and possible mitigation strategies in Section 4.2.
Our adversarial model is flexible in the sense that it accounts for a wide range of
communication interference. For example, the interference may not be malicious, but
could be the result of more benign hardware or software faults that cause a device to
disobey a specified MAC protocol. The adversary may also represent communication
errors resulting from unintended message collisions or fading effects which are typical
in the wireless setting [38].
61.2.4 Problem Definition for Consensus
The problem of consensus was first introduced in [46] and we provide a formal defini-
tion of the problem below.
Definition 2. (Consensus) Given n nodes, each node u begins with initial valuemu and
can decide an output satisfying: (1) Agreement: every node decides the same value; (2)
Validity: if a node decides m, then m is some node’s initial value; (3) Termination:
every correct node eventually decides and terminates.
The initial value and the output is application specific. In the context of fire alarm
sensors in the forest, the input could be the temperature at the sensor’s location. A
desired output might be the location which has the highest temperature.
Note that the criteria for which value to agree on is not the focus of the problem.
The challenge is to simply agree on some value. We follow the lead of much of the
previous literature in seeking to have every node agree on the minimum value from all
messages it has heard.
1.2.5 Problem Definition for Leader Election
The formal definition of leader election problem is given below.
Definition 3. (Leader Election) Given n nodes, each node u can decide an output
satisfying: (1) Uniqueness: there is exactly one node that considers itself as a leader;
(2) Agreement: all other nodes agree on the leader node; (3) Termination: every correct
node eventually selects a leader and terminates.
To be able to select a leader, the rest nodes need to know the identity of the leader to
perform further tasks. Note that this is not something that consensus addresses.
1.3 Related Work
Consensus is a well-studied problem and the bulk of the research can be divided ac-
cording to synchronicity modeling (see Chapter 5 of [14] for a survey of solutions to the
7consensus problem). The first model is synchronous communication [44] where a sent
message is received instantly (assuming the absence of any faults). The second model
is known as partially-synchronous communication [25] where a message is received
within bounded time, and after the bounded time expires, the message is considered
lost. The last model is that of asynchronous communication [15, 27, 39] where a mes-
sage can be delayed for any amount of time. In this case, in order to make progress,
several results assume that the majority of the network is eventually connected, and the
number of participants is known in advance [25, 39].
Aspnes et al. [5] present a solution to achieve consensus in wireless networks with
unlabeled nodes (that is, nodes do not have identities) that possess reliable communica-
tion. Work in [17] introduces collision detector for the unreliable communication and
node crashes. It works in a synchronous single-hop wireless network and uses message
loss to represent the unreliable communication. Our work uses the same model but as-
sumes that nodes are reliable and the unreliable communication is subsumed under the
adversary’s behavior.
Due to its numerous applications, there are many results on leader election [6–8,
22, 51]. Awerbuch et al. [7] develop the first medium-access control (MAC) proto-
col for leader election in wireless network that functions in the presence of a jamming
adversary; however, the amount of jamming is limited, and their algorithm assumes
some information about the size of the network. In [22], the authors present a random-
ized algorithm, based on recruiting so-called herald nodes that use a special channel
to broadcast their identifiers (IDs). Awerbuch et al. [8] provide a valuable study for
leader election and show that there is a solution requiring only very limited knowledge
about the adversary and the network that achieves a constant (asymptotically optimal)
throughput for the non-jammed time periods.
To date, there are no existing resource-competitive result for either consensus or
leader election. The most closely related works address the problem of transmitting a
message from a designated source node to all other nodes in the network [29,36]; this is
8known as the broadcast problem. Unfortunately, these previous results do not trivially
yield a consensus or leader-election algorithm; however, it can be leveraged to provide
a solution and this is discussed further in Section 2.1.
On the general topic of jamming attacks, it is well known that engaging in such
malicious behavior is simple and cheap to implement, and there are numerous works
addressing this issue [2, 3, 7, 23, 31, 32, 60, 61]. Dolev et al. [23] address a variety of
the interference sources in the wireless network, including selfish devices, malicious
jammers, and incidental radiations(radar, microwaves, etc).
Frequency hopping [26, 43] is a well-known approach to foiling jamming, as the
devices continuously changes the frequency channel in some sequence to dodge the
jamming attack. The effectiveness of frequency hopping depends crucially on the limi-
tations placed on the adversary. If the adversary is capable of blocking all the channels,
then frequency hopping cannot provide robustness against jamming. Since the number
of channels available on the wireless spectrum is limited, an adversary that controls
even just a handful of devices can thwart frequency hopping; thus, considering a single
channel situation is often valuable.
There are results concerning encryption in wireless network [18, 53]. However,
while encryption can prevent an adaptive adversary from obtaining transmitted infor-
mation, it does not help mitigate the impact of jamming.
In terms of theoretical results, there are several that deserve discussion. Gilbert et
al. [28] explore the adversary’s jamming strategy on 1-to-1 communication model us-
ing deterministic protocols, and derive bounds on how long the adversary can delay
the message. Pelc and Peleg [47] study the feasibility and complexity of the broadcast
model of which nodes randomly cause jamming, crash and byzantine faults. Koo et
al. [37] solves the broadcast problem under the case that the jamming adversary’s en-
ergy budget is bounded. Richa et al. [49] extend the work from [7] into a multi-hop
model. They consider a reactive jammer in [50]. In [52], they build solutions with a
more complex single-hop network model that the nodes belong to different co-existing
9subnetworks.
There are several works that address the energy cost against jamming adversaries
[29, 33, 35, 37, 41]; however, they focus only on the cost incurred by correct nodes. In
the context of resource competitiveness, there are a handful of results. Gilbert et al. [31]
give an one-to-n resource-competitive broadcast algorithm that tolerates a 1-uniform
jamming adversary. King et al. [36] address 1-to-1 communication in the presence of a
2-uniform adversary, and this work is later extended to the 1-to-n adversary by Gilbert
and Young [29].
1.4 Contributions
We present the first resource-competitive algorithms for consensus and leader election.
Each algorithm succeeds with high probability which is defined below.
Definition 4. (High probability) Given n nodes and a period of time with size of
max{n, T}, there is an event happens with a probability of at least 1 − 1
max{nc,T c} ,
where c > 1, preferably if c is some tunable constant. We say this event happens with
high probability.
For both consensus and leader election, we do not assume that good nodes know the
value of n, nor do they have an estimate of it. Our main results are stated below.
Theorem 1. Assume a 1-uniform adaptive adversary and n wireless devices. There
exists an algorithm that solves the problem of consensus and provides the following
guarantees with high probability:
• The expected cost to each node is O(√T/n lg2.5 n+ lg5 n)
• All nodes terminate within expected O(T · lg T/ lg n+ n lg3 n) time slots.
For the problem of leader election, we have the following result.
Theorem 2. Assume a 1-uniform adaptive adversary and n wireless devices. There
exists an algorithm that solves the problem of leader election and provides the following
guarantee with high probability:
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• The expected cost to each node is O(√T/n lg2.5 n+ lg5 n)
• All nodes terminate within expected O(T · lg T/ lg n+ n lg3 n) time slots.
Both algorithms have the same expected cost and number of time slots (latency); indeed,
both algorithms are similar in their function. Our results are based on extensions of the
resource-competitive broadcast algorithm presented in [29]. As we will describe in de-
tail in the next section, consensus can be achieved by carefully modifying this broadcast
algorithm. However, significant additional analytical work is required to prove correct-
ness. Our consensus algorithm is then modified further to provide a leader-election
algorithm.
We note that our algorithms are resource competitive. Here, we have ρ = O(
√
T/n·
lg2.5 n) and τ = O(lg5 n). In other words, good nodes experience a better-than-
quadratic advantage in cost over the adversary. In the energy-constrained setting of
wireless sensor networks, this implies that the adversary will deplete her onboard en-
ergy supply far faster than the correct nodes.
Finally, as a secondary contribution, the techniques in the document can be used to
improve the cost function of the 1-to-n broadcast algorithm in [29] fromO(
√
T/n lg4 n+
lg6 n) toO(
√
T/n lg2.5 n+lg5 n) with only a logarithmic factor increase in the expected
latency, from O(T + n lg2 n) to O(T · lg T/ lg n+ n lg3 n).
1.5 Outline
In Chapter 2, we present the intuition behind our resource-competitive algorithm,
and give formal arguments for the correctness and performance of our consensus algo-
rithm, RC-CONSENSUS. In Chapter 3, we show how to modify our solution from the
consensus problem and obtain our leader-election algorithm, RC-LEADER-ELECTION.
Finally, in Chapter 4, discuss a number of practical considerations of our network
model, consider how our results might be extended to other adversarial models, and
propose several open problems that deserve attention in the future.
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2. Consensus
The consensus problem in wireless network is described in Definition 2 in Section
1.2.4. The pseudocode for our protocol RC-CONSENSUS is specified in Figure 2.1.
As mentioned in the section 1.4, we expand upon the 1-to-n broadcast algorithm in
[29]. Before continuing, it is worth exploring why we cannot directly apply a broadcast
algorithm to achieve a solution to consensus.
2.1 A Consensus Solution Using Broadcast
In the broadcast problem, there is one source node that begins with a message m,
and the goal is for all nodes to obtainm. If we have a broadcast primitive, then a natural
approach for achieving consensus is as follows. Each node runs the broadcast value as
the source node with its initial value and collects values from all other nodes. In a wired
setting, where message collisions do not occur, this guarantees that all nodes can decide
on, say, the minimum value received. In the wireless setting, where message collisions
(two or more nodes send at same time) can occur, this approach has its challenges.
Another major problem with this approach is that it gives poor resource-competitive
guarantees. Indeed, the broadcast primitive must be executed O(n) times (which yields
a large τ ), and this can only be worse if the adversary jams. This illustrates that naively
employing a broadcast algorithm does not immediately yield a (resource-competitive)
consensus algorithm.
Fortunately, with more care, we show that it is possible to extend the particular
broadcast algorithm in [29] to achieve a consensus algorithm. Intuitively, if a node
receives a lower value than the one it current holds, then the node should adopt the
lower value and continue broadcasting with this lower value. The first challenge is
showing that such a process will indeed allow all nodes to eventually agree, even in the
presence of jamming that attempts to stymie the propagation of the minimum value.
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The second challenge lies in the termination portion of the algorithm. How does
a node know when all other nodes have received the same (minimum) value? Can
this be done quickly with low cost, even when nodes do not know n? Particularly
worrisome are “race cases” where some nodes receive a small (but not minimum) value
and terminate the protocol before the true minimum has a chance to fully propagate.
With respect to these issues, the broadcast algorithm of [29] makes no guarantees.
The pseudocode for our consensus algorithm, RC-CONSENSUS, is given in Fig-
ure 2.1. The algorithm specification itself is a natural extension of [29]. However, this
extension requires an involved analytical argument in order to prove that we can over-
come the challenges discussed above. In the next section, we provide an overview of
the intuition for why this algorithm succeeds in achieving consensus.
RC-CONSENSUS
For each node u, do:
mu ← arbitrary value
For each epoch i ≥ 8 with node u
• tu ← participant, Su ← 1, cu ← 0
• Repeat bi3 times:
– For each of the 2i slots:
· Send mu with probability Su2i
· Listen with probability Sudi
2i
– If more than Sudi
8
clear slots were detected, then do:
· cu ← cu + 1 and, if cu mod bi2 = 0, then Su ← 2Su
– Execute one of the following:
· If Su ≥ 520 · 2i/2, u terminates.
· Else if u hears m that is smaller than mu, then mu ← m and tu ←
participant.
· Else if tu = participant and mu is heard at least di128 times in
a repetition, then u← helper, S ′u = Su.
· Else if tu = helper and Su ≥ 132S ′u, u decidesm and terminates.
Figure 2.1: Pseudocode of RC-CONSENSUS
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2.2 Overview of RC-CONSENSUS
At the start, every node u is assumed to possess an arbitrary value mu. In the most
challenging case, we may assume that the adversary assigns a value to each node. The
goal of RC-CONSENSUS is to have all nodes to reach consensus
As discussed in Section 1.2.4 , many consensus protocols prescribe that nodes agree
on either the minimum (or maximum) value held by any node. This is true of RC-
CONSENSUS where all nodes will agree on the minimum value m0 with high probabil-
ity.
We divide the fixed time slots into epochs and repetitions. In each epoch i, there
are bi3 repetitions and each repetition consists 2i time slots. The parameter i is indexed
starting from the value 0. The size of each epoch grow exponentially so that the size of
a repetition can catch the size of n in logarithmic epochs and the cost for the adversary
grows exponentially after each epoch. We assume that all nodes start from the same
epoch. Each node u has a status tu. tu can be either participant, helper and
terminated. Initially every node starts with the status participant. Depending
on events that occur during epoch, tu can be set to helper or terminated. In each
repetition, each node u sends and listens message with certain probabilities according
to its value Su. At the end of each repetition, each node u analyzes the slots it hears,
and will send the minimum value among all messages it has heard and its own value in
the next repetition.
Tuning of Sending and Listening Probabilities. Each node u maintains Su that dic-
tates the probability of sending and listening in each slot. At the beginning of each
epoch, Su is reset to 1. Su increases according to the state of another value cu main-
tained by u. In particular, for repetition j of epoch i, node u increments cu if and only if
u hears at least Su d i/8 clear slots in the repetition. Within an epoch, for each instance
where cu increments bi2 times, Su doubles; otherwise, Su remains unchanged.
Why should Su behave in this fashion? There is a delicate balance to be maintained
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in setting this value. Too large, and each node will incur a high cost due to sending and
listening, and the communication channel will become heavily congested resulting in
message collisions. Too small, and nodes cannot communicate with each other in their
attempts to reach consensus.
It turns out that the “Goldilocks region” is when Su = Θ(
√
2i/n). For this region,
the probability whether a node receives m0 is constant, the congestion is low, and the
cost relative to the adversary is small. But how can a node u set Su = Θ(
√
2i/n)?
Recall that n is unknown and nodes do not even possess a rough estimate of this value
a priori.
The intuition for addressing this challenge is as follows. Upon initialization, almost
all slots contain message collisions since each Su = Θ(1) is large relative to i. But
as Su remains fixed and i increases, the number of slots in each repetition increases.
This reduces the contention for the channel until, when i ≈ lg n, a constant fraction of
the slots are clear. This is a variant of the well-known process of standard exponential
backoff.
This constant fraction of clear slots indicates that the Goldilocks region has been
achieved. For example, note here that Su = Θ(
√
2i/n) =
√
2lgn/n = Θ(1). Since
it is too costly for a node u to listen to all slots in a repetition, u samples Θ(i) slots in
order to determine whether the region has been reached. If u hears more than Sudi/8
clear slots in a repetition, the variable cu increments and, when cu mod bi2 = 0, Su is
doubled.
Why employ so many repetitions? Since nodes must sample slots from a repetition,
it is possible for two nodes u and v to witness different quantities of clear slots. For
example, consider the event where u hears more than Su d i/8 clear slots while v hears
at most Sv d i/8 clear slots. Intuitively, such an event should not cause a large discrep-
ancy since it is equally likely that the opposite occurs (i.e. u hears at most Su d i/8
clear slots while v hears more than Sv d i/8 clear slots) and, thus, the situation balances
out in expectation. In order to bound the maximum divergence with high probability,
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nodes double Su more cautiously. Thus, such an event must happen bi2 times in order
to deviate by a factor of 2, and this is very unlikely within an epoch (after which, Su
and cu values are reset).
Another thing to note is that we require Ω(i3) repetitions. A sufficient number of
repetitions are required for Su to reach the Goldilocks region. Once there, Su should
remain static long enough for m0 to propagate to all nodes. At such a point, given a
constant probability that a node receives m0 is constant, Θ(i) = Ω(log n) mostly-clear
repetitions are necessary to ensure all nodes have m0. Having bi3 repetitions facilitates
this process.
Two important questions remain. First, what effect does jamming have on the tun-
ing of sending and listening probabilities? Second, even if m0 is held by all nodes, how
does each node know it is safe to terminate?
Contending with Jamming. By jamming the channel, the adversary can reduce the
number of clear slots. Consequently, Su may not increase and reach the Goldilocks
region, and so consensus may be thwarted. Therefore, a node u should wait until its Su
is close to the region. How can u know if Su has reached the Goldilocks region?
When a node u hears some messagem a sufficient number of times in epoch i, while
m is not necessarily the minimum value m0, it assumes its Su is close to the Goldilocks
region that nodes can hear messages. We call this status as “helper” as the helper node
helps other nodes to hear m0. when a node becomes a helper, it records its current Su
value as S ′u which is proved later to be at least
1
33
√
2i/n.
For a sufficient large Su, we also employ an additional constant d > 0 in establishing
the listening probability. For a sufficiently large d, if a repetition has some fraction of
non-jammed slots, we can guarantee with high probability that each node has heard a
message by the end of this repetition.
To detect an unblocked repetition, nodes sample the fraction of clear slots heard in a
repetition. If a sufficiently large fraction of the slots are clear, then the node u assumes
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that the repetition is unblocked. The node u maintains a parameter cu that increments
for each unblocked repetition (and resets only at the end of the epoch). Because when
cu increments, there are at least Sudi/8 clear slots over the total of Sudi expected slots
in the repetition.
Termination. With the ideal sending and listening probability, a node has some guaran-
teed probability to hear a message from any other node during a repetition without too
much jamming. Therefore, nodes could simply wait long enough to hear from others,
and afterwards each node could then find the minimum value m0. Why do we add the
rule that each node sends the minimum value among all messages it has heard?
By having nodes transmit the minimum value they have heard, we increase the speed
at whichm0 propagates. That is, the probability of hearing the minimum value increases
as more nodes start sending m0. Under this approach, we will show in Lemma 7 that
we only need a polylogarithmic number of repetitions without too much jamming. Note
that a node does not immediately change its message when it has heard a smaller value;
the node adopts the smallest value it has heard only at the end of each repetition.
Our algorithm also shares a potential termination issue with the algorithm in [29].
With a very small but not-zero probability, some node u never hears any message dur-
ing the execution. Every other node successfully terminates, but u can become stuck
in the network. To help such exceptionally unlucky nodes terminate, we add the alter-
nate termination condition (Case 1 in the pseudocode) to force the nodes to terminate.
This is a more expensive event for such a node, but the low probability of this event
means that our expected cost guarantees remain intact. The energy cost in this case is
O(
√
n+ T lg3 n). We will discuss this case in detail in the proof of Theorem 1.
2.3 Analysis of RC-CONSENSUS
We break our analysis into four main sections. In the first section, we establish some
preliminary facts that provide the tools for computing the probability that a node hears
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a message in a slot. The value Su determines the listening and the sending probabilities,
and we also place constraints on the behavior of this variable. In particular, we show
that for any two nodes u and v, Su and Sv do not differ by more than a small constant.
Furthermore, we show that unless the adversary jams substantially in an epoch (which
is costly), Su can grow to a sufficient to allow for rapid propagation of m0.
In the message propagation section, we show that with a sufficiently large Su for
every node u, the number of nodes which have heard the minimum value grows at least
by a factor of i/4 in every unblocked repetition. In expectation, we need to wait only
logi/4 n unblocked repetitions. We show that when some node achieves Su ≥ 4
√
2i
n
all
nodes are guaranteed a sufficiently large number of unblocked repetitions for all nodes
to receive m0.
In the termination section, we analyze the termination rule for RC-CONSENSUS.
First, we prove that when some node u assumes helper status, the recorded value S ′u ≥
2i/2
33
√
n
. By the pseudocode, when a node terminates, Su ≥ 132S ′u ≥ 4
√
2i
n
. With the
size of Su and the proof in the last section, we can prove that every node has heard
the minimum value with high probability before it terminates; therefore, we avoid any
possible race case.
Finally, in the fourth section, the cost of this algorithm is analyzed. Here, we
demonstrate that the cost of a node is O(
√
T
n
· lg3 n+ lg4 n), thus proving our resource-
competitive result.
2.3.1 Preliminaries
Before we begin the main analysis, we state some technical lemmas and facts used
later on. We often employ the following well-established Chernoff bounds.
Theorem 3. ( [45]) Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent trials such that Pr(Xi) = p and let
X =
∑n
i=1Xi. For any δ, where 0 < δ < 1,
Pr(X > (1 + δ)E[X]) ≤ e−δ2 E[X]/3
Pr(X < (1− δ)E[X]) ≤ e−δ2 E[X]/2
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The following inequalities are well known:
Fact 1. 1− x ≥ e−2x for any 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2.
Fact 2. 1− x ≤ e−x for any x.
Properties used in Algorithm: Each node u begins with a value (or message) mu.
Out of all such messages, the one with the lowest value is denoted by m0. Our goal in
consensus is to have all nodes agree on m0.
Let m0 be the minimum value among all nodes’ messages. For any message m, let
Am be the set of all non-terminated nodes that currently consider m as the minimum
value at some point in epoch i. Similarly, letA is the set of all non-terminated nodes that
currently consider m0 (the true minimum value) as the minimum value at some point in
epoch i. Let V be the set of all nodes that have not terminated. Define SA =
∑
u∈A
Su
2i
and SV =
∑
u∈V
Su
2i
. Define pm to be the probability that exactly one node sends m
while all others stay silent, and let pc be the probability that an unjammed slot is clear.
In RC-CONSENSUS, recall that time slots are grouped into repetitions and epochs.
We assume that the adversary also plans the jamming attack in every repetition. Because
an adversary does not know whether the current time slot contains a message and the
event happens independently in every slot, we do not go into the details about which
time slots are jammed. Instead, we only discuss the total fraction of slots jammed in
every repetition.
Definition 5. (q-non-jammed repetition) If an adversary jams a repetition but leaves
a q-fraction of time slots, we say the repetition is a q-non-jammed repetition.
If the adversary jams a large fraction of the slots in a repetition, then nodes are unlikely
to hear any message or clear slots. We narrow our definition to the cases where q <
1/12 or q ≥ 1/12 as this is frequently useful:
Definition 6. (Blocked repetition) Given a repetition j, if q < 1/12 in that repetition,
it is a blocked repetition; if q ≥ 1/12, it is an unblocked repetition.
The following bounds on pm and pc were provided in [29]. For completeness, we in-
clude the proof in this document.
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Figure 2.2: The structure of the argument for analyzing RC-CONSENSUS.
Lemma 1. (Gilbert et al. [29]) SA ·e−2SV ≤ pm ≤ eSA ·e−SV and e−2SV ≤ pc ≤ e−SV .
Proof. For a fixed slot, the probability that node u ∈ A sends m in an otherwise clear
slot is Su
2i
∏
k∈V−{u}(1− Sk2i ). Therefore, over all nodes in A, the probability pm is
pm =
∑
v∈A
(
Sv
2i
·
∏
k∈V−{v}
(1− Sk
2i
)) Using Fact 1
≥ 1
2i
∑
v∈A
(Sv · e−
2
2i
∑
V−{v} Sk) Using
∑
V−{v} Sk =
∑
k∈V Sk − Sv
≥ 1
2i
∑
v∈A
Sv · e−
2
2i
∑
k∈V Sk Replace with SA, SV
≥ SA · e−2SV
Conversely, we can upper bound pm:
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pm =
∑
v∈A
(
Sv
2i
·
∏
k∈V−{v}
(1− Sk
2i
)) Using Fact 2
≤
∑
v∈A
(
Sv
2i
· e−
∑
k∈V
Sk
2i
+Sv
2i )) Using Sv
2i
≤ 1
≤
∑
v∈A
(
Sv
2i
· e−
∑
k∈V
Sk
2i
+1) Replace with SA, SV
≤ eSA · e−SV
To calculate pc, we note that pc =
∏
u∈V (1 − Su2i ). This quantity is at least e−2SV by
Fact 1 and at most pc ≤ e−SV by Fact 2.
By Lemma 1, we know that pm and pc are related to the size of the Su values and the
current epoch i. Without quantifying Su and i, we can not determine pc. Because a node
u’s Su is doubled every time u’s cu increments such that cu mod bi2 = 0, we need to
show the growth of cu. The growth of cu depends on Su and the fraction of non-jammed
slots in a repetition q.
The following Lemmas are all guaranteed with high probability. If the adversary
jams heavily (blocking all repetitions) up until some epoch i, then T = Ω(2i). After
this point, when the heavy jamming ceases (repetitions are unblocked), we expect nodes
to terminate fairly quickly. Given that the execution time of the algorithm is not neces-
sarily polynomial in n, our notion of “with high probability” in Definition 4 is given as
1− 1
max{nc,T c} .
Therefore, when every node u terminates in epoch i, 2i = max{n, T}. If an event
fails with at most e−Ω(i), it succeeds with the probability of 1 − 1
max{nc,T c} , in other
words, it happens with high probability.
Lemma 2. In any repetition of epoch i ≥ lg n − 1, with high probability the behavior
of cu obeys the following:
• cu doesn’t increment at the end of a blocked repetition.
• If the adversary jams the repetition such that all nodes u have Su > 2i ln(12q)n and
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q > 1/12, no node u increments cu.
• If the adversary jams the repetition such that all nodes u have Su ≤ 2i−1 ln(4q)n and
q > 1/4, every node u increments cu.
Proof. In epoch i, in order to increment cu, the node u must hear more than Sudi8 clear
slots in a repetition. By Lemma 1, the probability that a slot is clear is pc ≥ e−2SV ,
where SV =
∑
u∈V
Su
2i
. For node u, define the binary random variable Yj such that
Yj = 1 if it is a clear slot; otherwise, Yj = 0. Therefore, Y =
∑2i
j Yj denotes the total
number of clear slots u heard during a repetition. In a repetition of q · 2i non-jammed
slots, by linearity of expectation, the expected number of clear slots is:
E[Y ] = E
[∑2i
j
Yj
]
=
∑2i
j
E [Yj]
=
∑q 2i
j
pc
Sudi
2i
= pc q · Sudi
By Lemma 1, the probability that a slot is clear is e−2SV ≤ pc ≤ e−SV . Therefore, we
have the following bound on E[Y ]:
e−2SV q · Sudi ≤ E[Y ] ≤ e−SV q · Sudi (2.1)
Using this inequality and Definition 6, in a blocked repetition, the expected number of
clear slots heard by a node is E[Y ] ≤ e−SV · 1
12
· Sudi < Sudi12 . Applying a Chernoff
bound, the probability a node hears more than Sudi
8
clear slots is Pr(Y ≥ Sudi
8
) =
Pr(Y ≥ (1 + 1/2)E[Y ]) ≤ e− (1/2)
2E[Y ]
3 = e−
Sudi
96 = e−Ω(i).
Taking a union bound over all n nodes, yields that the probability that any node
hears more than Sudi
8
slots is at most n e−Ω(i) = e−Ω(i) for sufficiently large constant
d > 0 since i ≥ lg(n)− 1. Therefore, for sufficiently large d, no node u increments cu
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in a blocked repetition.
In an unblocked repetition where q > 1/12, assume that each node u has Su >
2i−1 ln(12q)
n
. Then SV =
∑
u∈V
Su
2i
> 2
i−1n ln(12q)
2in
= ln(12q)
2
. By Equation 2.1, with a
repetition of q · 2i non-jammed slots, the expected number of clear slots E[Y ′] is
E[Y ′] < e−SV · Sudi
2i
· q · 2i = Sudi
12
Using Chernoff bound, the probability that any nodes u’s cu increments in this repetition
is Pr(Y ≥ Sudi
8
) = Pr(Y ≥ (1 + 1/2)E[Y ]) ≤ e− (1/2)
2E[Y ]
3 = e−
Sudi
96 = e−Ω(i). Taking
a union bound over all n nodes, yields that the probability that any node hears more
than Sudi
8
slots is at most n e−Ω(i) = e−Ω(i) for sufficiently large constant d > 0 since
i ≥ lg(n)− 1. Therefore, for sufficiently large d, no node u increments cu in a blocked
repetition.
Consider the repetitions which q > 1/4. Assume that each node u has Su ≤
2i−1 ln(4q)
n
, we have SV ≤ 2i−1n ln(4q)2in = ln(4q)2 . By Equation 2.1 the expected number
of clear slots heard by any node u is
E[Y ] ≥ e−2SV q · Sudi ≥ e− ln(4q) · qSudi ≥ Sudi
4
Using Chernoff bound, the probability that any nodes u’s cu does not increment in this
repetition is Pr(Y < Sudi
8
) = Pr(Y < (1 − 1/2)E[Y ]) ≤ e− (1/2)
2E[Y ]
2 = e−
Sudi
64 =
e−Ω(i). Taking a union bound over all n nodes, yields that the probability that any node
hears less than Sudi
8
slots is at most n e−Ω(i) = e−Ω(i) for sufficiently large constant
d > 0 since i ≥ lg(n)− 1. Therefore, for sufficiently large d, every node u increments
cu in a blocked repetition.
Our next argument proves some useful facts about when nodes begin to modify their
state. Intuitively, very few slots should be clear prior to an epoch i ≈ lg n; the sending
rate is simply too high. The fact that nodes may change state only when i = lg n+Ω(1)
comes in useful for our high-probability guarantees throughout our argument.
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Lemma 3. The following two statements hold with high probability:
• No node u increments cu in epoch i ≤ lg n− 2.
• No node terminates when i < lg n+ 6.
Proof. A node u becomes a helper when it hears messages identical to its own mu
at least di
128
times in one repetition. Then, u needs to increase Su until Su ≥ 132S ′u.
The value of Su can at most double in an epoch, and its initial value is 1. Therefore,
Su ≥ 256 (i.e. the next power of 2 after 132) when u terminates.
In order to prove this lemma, we consider two different ranges of i. For 1 ≤ i ≤
lg n− 2, we will show that no node u increments cu with high probability. For (lg n)−
2 < i < (lg n) + 6, we will show that Su < 256 for all u, and this implies that no node
terminates.
Case 1. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ (lg n)− 2. At the beginning of an epoch, each node u has Su = 1
and, therefore, SV = n/2i = 2lgn/2i = 2lgn−i. According to SV , the expected number
of clear slots heard by every node u is E[Y ] ≤ e−SV Sudi = Sudi
e2
lgn−i .
To begin with a Chernoff Bound, let (1 + δ)E[Y ] = Sudi
8
, put in E[Y ] ≤ Sudi
e2
lgn−i , we
have δ = Sudi
8
/E[Y ] − 1 ≥ e2lgn−i
8
− 1; since, i ≤ lg n − 2, note that δ ≥ e4
8
− 1 =
5.85 > 0. By a Chernoff bound, the probability that Y > Sudi
8
is:
Pr(Y >
Sudi
8
) = Pr(Y > (1 + δ)E[Y ])
< e−
δ2E[Y ]
3 using E[Y ] ≤ Sudi
e2
lgn−i and δ = e
2lgn−i
8
− 1
< e
− (e2
lgn−i
/8−1)2Sudi
3e2
lgn−i
< e−Ω(i·e
2lgn−i )
This shows that the probability of cu incrementing depends on the function i e2
lgn−i .
The function i · e2lgn−i decreases as i increases. Therefore, for 1 ≤ i ≤ lg n − 2, the
probability that cu increments is maximized when i = lg n− 2. Hence,we aim to prove
that, for i = lg n− 2, no node u increments cu with high probability.
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In the case that i = lg n − 2, the expected number of clear slots is E[Y ] ≤ Sudi
e4
.
Letting (1 + δ′)E[Y ] = Sudi
8
, and substituting in E[Y ] ≤ Sudi
e4
, we have δ′ > e4/8− 1.
The probability that Y > Sudi
8
is:
Pr(Y >
Sudi
8
) = Pr((1 + δ′)E[Y ])
< e−
δ′2E[Y ]
3 using E[Y ] ≤ Sudi
e4
and δ′ > e4/8− 1
< e−
(e4/8−1)2Sudi
3e4 using i = lg n− 2
< n−c
where c > 0 is any constant depending only on sufficiently large d. Therefore, the
probability that cu increment in a repetition is at most n−c if i ≤ lg n− 2. The constant
c is a tunable parameter controlled by d. We would continue to see how often this case
happens among a total of b · i3 repetitions. Taking a union bound on n nodes, the prob-
ability that no node u increments cu is n · n−c ≤ n−(c−1). Therefore, with a sufficiently
large d, no node increments cu in epoch i ≤ lg n− 2 with high probability.
Case 2. Assume that i ≥ lg n−1. By Lemma 2, if Su > 2i ln(12q)n , with high probability,
no node u increments cu. Therefore, before cu stops incrementing (w.h.p), a node u can
attain a maximum value Su ≤ 2i+1 ln(12q)n (in the case where Su = 2
i ln(12q)
n
− δ for some
small δ > 0 and then doubles). Starting with Su = 1 for i = lg(n)−1, how many times
has Su doubled in this case? Since q ≤ 1, we have:
Su ≤ 2
i+1 ln 12
n
(2.2)
For any epoch i where lg n − 1 ≤ i ≤ lg n + 5, the upper bound Su ≤ 2i+1 ln 12n ≤
64 ln(12) < 256 which implies that, with high probability, we cannot have Su ≥ 256
for these values of i. Thus, with high probability, no node terminates when i ≤ lg n+ 5
which concludes our argument.
The next piece of our argument addresses the deviation between Su and Sv for any two
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nodes u and v. Recall that, since Su and Sv dictate the sending and listening probabil-
ities, a large deviation could imply an unfair distribution of cost among the n nodes.
However, we show in the next lemma that this is not possible (with high probability).
The intuition behind this argument is that, since the adversary is 1-uniform, all nodes
should witness roughly the same numbe of clear slots when they sample the channel.
Due to this uniformity, the growth of Su and Sv should be similar.
Lemma 4. For any epoch i > lg n and any two nodes u and v, with high probability
1
2
≤ Su
Sv
≤ 2 for a sufficiently large constant b > 0.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that cu > cv ≥ 0. Fix an epoch i and
consider the bi3 repetitions in this epoch. We wish to argue that, if cu = kbi2, then
cv ≥ (k − 1)bi2 for any integer value 1 ≤ k ≤ i and sufficiently large b > 0, with high
probability. In other words, Su ≤ 2Sv.
Let the random indicator variable Xj = 1 if node u witnesses at least Su d i8 clear
slots in repetition j of epoch i, and let cu = X =
∑
j Xj . Let variables Yj and cv =
Y =
∑
Yj be defined similarly for node v.
What is the probability that X − E[X] > bi2/2? Using Theorem 3, a Chernoff
bound yields:
Pr(X > (1 + δ)E[X]) = Pr(X − E[X] > δ · E[X])
≤ e−δ2E[X]/2
When X − E[X] > bi2/2 and X − E[X] > bi2/2, E[X] < (k − 1/2)bi2. Letting
δ · E[X] = bi2/2, and we have
δ =
bi2/2
E[X]
Derive δ from δ · E[X] = bi2/2
>
bi2/2
(k − 1/2)bi2 Using E[X] < (k − 1/2)bi
2
>
1
2k − 1
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Therefore, we can derive the probability that X − E[X] > bi2/2 as
Pr(X − E[X] > δ · E[X]) = Pr(X − E[X] > bi2/2)
≤ e−δ2E[X]/2
= e−δbi
2/4 Using δ > 1
2k−1
< e−bi
2/8k−4 Using k ≤ i
< e−c i
for any desired constant c > 0 depending only on a sufficiently large b. Therefore,
w.h.p., E[X] ≥ (k − 1/2)bi2. Since the adversary is 1-uniform, E[X] = E[Y ]. It
follows that:
Pr (Y < (1− δ′)E[Y ]) = Pr (Y < (1− δ′)E[X])
≤ Pr (Y < (1− δ′)(k − 1/2)bi2)
= Pr(Y < (k − 1)bi2) letting δ = 1/(2k − 1)
≤ e−
(k−1)bi2
2(2k−1)2
= e−c
′ i
for any desired constant c′ > 0 depending only on a sufficiently large b. Therefore, with
high probability, if cu = kbi2, then cv ≥ (k − 1)bi2. It follows that cu − cv ≤ bi2 and,
therefore, Su ≤ 2Sv.
As the final preliminary argument, we show that it is very costly for the adversary to
prevent any node u from having Su reach the Goldilocks region. That is, the adversary
must jam for a constant fraction of the time to prevent this. This argument is useful in
showing that cost relationship between the adversary and each node.
Lemma 5. In any epoch i ≥ lg n + 6, with high probability some node u achieves
Su ≥ 4
√
2i
n
unless the adversary jams at least a 7/10-fraction of slots in each of at
least bi3/2 repetitions.
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Proof. By Lemma 2, if the adversary jams the repetition such that all nodes u have
Su ≤ 2i−1 ln(4q)n and q > 1/4, then every node u increments cu with high probability.
In a 3/10-non-jammed repetition, 2
i−1 ln(4q)
n
≥ 2i
n
> 4
√
2i
n
. Therefore, before some
node v achieves Sv ≥ 4
√
2i
n
, with high probability every node u increments cu in such
repetitions.
Assume that in epoch i ≥ lg n + 6, there are at least bi3/2 repetitions, each of
which has less than a 7/10-fraction of slots jammed. After bi3/2 repetitions, with high
probability, cu ≥ bi3/2. Therefore, as specifed by the pseudocode, Su = cu mod bi2 ≥
2i/2 ≥ 4
√
2i
n
. Hence, with high probability some node u achieves Su ≥ 4
√
2i
n
unless
the adversary jams at least a 7/10-fraction of slots for each of at least bi3/2 repetitions.
2.3.2 Message Propagation
With our preliminary arguments established, we now begin to analyze the message
propagation. Let Ai,j nodes sending m0 in epoch i and repetition j. Let |Ai,j| denote
the number of nodes in Ai,j . In this subsection, we show the speed of the message
propagation. The number of nodes who have heard m0, |A|, grows exponentially in
every unblocked repetition after every node u has Su ≥
√
2i/n.
Lemma 6. In epoch i ≥ lg n, assume each node u has Su ≥
√
2i/n and let d > 0 be a
sufficiently large constant. If repetition j is an unblocked repetition, then |Ai,j+1| obeys
the following with high probability:
• If |Ai,j| ≤ ni , then |Ai,j+1| ≥ i4 |Ai,j|
• If |Ai,j| > ni , then m0 is received by all nodes within eight unblocked repetitions.
Proof. For node u, define the binary random variable Xu such that Xu = 1 if u hears
m0 at least once in a fixed repetition; otherwise,Xu = 0. Therefore,X =
∑
u∈V Xu de-
notes the total number of nodes that receive m0 in this fixed repetition. The probability
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Figure 2.3: The structure of the argument for analyzing RC-CONSENSUS. The shaded
area indicates what has already been proved.
that u fails to hear m0 in this fixed repetition is:
Pr(Xu = 0) =
(
1− pm · Su d i
2i
)q·2i
≤ e−pm q Su d i by applying Fact 2.
We now examine this probability, and we begin by lower bounding pm. By Lemma 1,
pm ≥ SA · e−2SV . By assumption, Su ≥
√
2i/n for each node u, and it follows that:
SA =
∑
u∈A
Su
2i
≥ |Ai,j|√
2in
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By Equation 2.2, Su ≤ 2i ln 12n for all nodes u with high probability. It follows that:
SV =
∑
u∈V
Su
2i
≤ ln 12
Therefore, it follows that:
pm ≥ SA e−2·SV
≥ |Ai,j|√
2in e2 ln 12
In an unblocked repetition, q ≥ 1
12
. We set d sufficiently large such that e−2 ln 12 q d ≥ 1.
Therefore, we have:
Pr(Xu = 0) ≤ e−pm q Su d i
≤ e−
|Ai,j |i
n
It follows that the probability node u receives m in a repetition is:
Pr(Xu = 1) = 1− Pr(Xu = 0) (2.3)
≥ 1− e−
|Ai,j |i
n (2.4)
Consider the case where |Ai,j| ≤ n/i. Then, |Ai,j|i/(2n) ≤ 1/2. By applying Fact 1,
we have Pr(Xu = 1) ≥ |Ai,j |i2n . Then, the expected number of nodes who receive m0 at
least once in this repetition is:
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E[X] ≥ E
[∑
u∈V
Xu
]
=
∑
u∈V
E[Xu] by linearity of expectation
=
∑
u∈V
Pr(Xu = 1)
≥ |Ai,j|i
2
By a Chernoff bound, the probability that X < (1/2)E[X] is
Pr(X < (1/2)E[X]) = Pr(X < (1− 1/2)E[X]) ≤ e−
i|Ai,j |
8 = e−Ω(i)
Therefore, X ≥ lgn
4
|Ai,j| with high probability. The value |Ai,j+1| includes the nodes
who hold the message m0 or hear m0 in the repetition j. Hence |Ai,j+1| ≥ X ≥
lgn
4
|Ai,j|.
Now consider the case where |Ai,j| > n/i. The probability Pr(Xu = 1) ≥ 1 −
e−1 ≥ 0.62. By a Chernoff bound, the probability that X ≤ (1/2)E[X] is
Pr(X < (1/2)E[X]) = Pr(X < (1− 1/2)0.62n) ≤ e− 0.62n8
Then |Ai,j+1| ≥ (1/2)E[X] ≥ 0.3n. When |Ai,j| ≥ 0.3n, the probability that node
u doesn’t hear m0 in an unblocked repetition is Pr(Xu = 0) ≤ e−0.3i by Equation 2.4.
After 7 unblocked repetitions, the probability that a node u hasn’t heard m0 is
Pr(X ′u = 0) = (Pr(Xu = 0))
7
= e−2.1i
Taking a union bound on n nodes, the probability that any node u hasn’t heard m0 is
less than n · e−2.1i = e−2.1i−lnn = e−Ω(i) since i ≥ lg n + 6. Therefore, with high
probability all nodes hear m0 within eight unblocked repetitions when |Ai,j| ≥ ni .
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In the next argument, we demonstrate that when a node u has Su in the Goldilocks
region, and then Su doubles, then u can be assured that every other nodes has received
the minimum value m0.
Lemma 7. Assume that in a repetition of epoch i ≥ lg n+ 6, there exists a node u with
2
√
2i/n ≤ Su < 4
√
2i/n, and let d > 0 be a sufficiently large constant. If u doubles
Su at the end of a repetition, then with high probability all nodes are helpers holding
m0 by the end of this repetition.
Proof. By Lemma 6, the number of nodes holding a message m is guaranteed to grow
by a factor of i
4
in every unblocked repetition of epoch i with high probability if every
node u’s Su ≥
√
2i/n and |A| ≤ n/i.
Pessimistically, assume that only one node holds m0 at the beginning of a repeti-
tion in epoch i. By Lemma 6, with high probability, at most logi/4 n − 1 unblocked
repetitions are needed to achieve |A| ≥ n/i, and then at most eight more unblocked
repetition for |A| = n. In other words, with high probability, at most logi/4 n + 7
unblocked repetitions are required for |A| = n.
For a node u, each time that Su doubles, it must be that cu has incremented at least
bi2 times since the previous time that Su doubled. In addition, the incrementing of cu
occurs at most once per repetition. If at the end of repetition j1 in epoch i, some node
v doubles Sv such that 2
√
2i/n ≤ Sv < 4
√
2i/n, by Lemma 4, every other node u has
Su ≥ (1/2)Sv ≥
√
2i/n.
Now consider a repetition j2 ≥ j1 in same epoch i where the mentioned node v
doubles its Sv again so that Sv ≥ 4
√
2i/n. It follows that j2 − j1 ≥ bi2; otherwise,
Su cannot have doubled. By Lemma 2, with high probability, each node u does not
increment cu in an blocked repetition. Therefore, whenever some node u increments
cu in a repetition, the repetition should be unblocked. Hence, if this event happens in
repetition j2, there are at least bi2 unblocked repetitions.
As argued above, at most logi/4 n+ 4 unblocked repetitions are needed for |A| = n.
By Lemma 3, i ≥ lg n+ 6. Additionally, note that by the pseudocode, i ≥ 8. It follows
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that logi/4 n + 4 ≤ lg n + 4 < bi2. Therefore, with high probability, bi2 repetitions are
sufficiently large to achieve |A| = n. Consequently, when any node u has 2√2i/n ≤
Su ≤ 4
√
2i/n and then doubles Su, all nodes have heard m0 at least once with high
probability.
Now that all nodes hold m0, we examine whether each node will become a helper
in an unblocked repetition. Since every non-terminated node is sending m0, it follows
that SA = SV =
∑
v∈V (Sv/2
i). By Lemma 1 and using SA = SV , pm ≥ SV · e−2SV .
To get a lower bound on pm, we derive a lower bound for both SV and e−2SV . By
Lemma 2, every node w has 2
√
2i/n ≤ Sw < 8
√
2i/n. By Lemma 4, we know that
i ≥ lg n + 6. Consequently, 8√n/2i ≤ 8√n/2lgn+6 = 1, and SV < 8√n/2i ≤
1. Therefore, using this inequality for SV and e−2SV , we have pm ≥ SV · e−2SV ≥
2e−2
√
n
2i
.
What is the expected number of times m0 is heard by a node w in a repetition of
epoch i? Let binary random variable Mj = 1 if w receives m0 in slot j of an unblocked
repetition; otherwise, let Mj = 0. Define M =
∑2i
j=1Mj . Noting that Pr(Mj = 1) ≥
pm q Sw di/2
i, we have E[M ] ≥∑2ij=1 E[Mj] = pm q Sw d i by linearity of expectation.
When the repetition is unblocked, we have the following:
E[M ] ≥ pm q Sw d i
≥
(
2e−2
√
n
2i
)
q Sw d i by plugging in the lower bound on pm
≥
(
2e−2
√
n
2i
) (
1
12
)
Sw d i since q ≥ 1/12 in an unblocked repetition
≥
(
2e−2
√
n
2i
) (
1
12
) (
2
√
2i
n
)
d i by the lower bound on Sw
≥ d i
3e2
>
di
128
Therefore, node w expects to hear enough messages to exceed the threshold to be a
helper. Using Theorem 3 with δ = d i
3e2
/ di
128
= 0.83, using a standard Chernoff bound
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yields:
Pr
(
M <
di
128
)
= Pr (M < (1− 0.83)E[M ])
≤ e− 0.83
2di
2·128
≤ e− di371
≤ e−Ω(i)
Therefore, with a sufficiently large constant d > 0, all nodes are helpers with the iden-
tical message m0 with high probability. Taking a union bound on n nodes, the prob-
ability that every node u becomes a helper is n · e−Ω(i) = e−Ω(i)+lgn = e−Ω(i) since
i ≥ lg n+ 6.
2.3.3 Reaching Termination
Continuing with progress illustrated in Figure 2.4, we are going to analyze the final
piece of the algorithm which addresses termination.
Lemma 8. Let the set Am denote the set of nodes sending message m in a repetition.
For any message m, when a node u ∈ Am becomes a helper in epoch i ≥ lg n+ 6, then
with high probability Su ≥ 2i/233√n .
Proof. We will prove this Lemma by contradiction. When some node u has Su ≤ 2i/233√n
in epoch i ≥ lg n+6, it can never hear enough number of some identical messagesm in
a repetition to become a helper. Let the number of identical messages heard by a node
in one repetition be M , and in this repetition assume that there are q · 2i non-jammed
slots. The expected number of identical messages heard is E[M ] = pm · Sudi2i · q · 2i =
q pm Su d i. Since q ≤ 1, E[M ] ≤ pm Su d i.
By Lemma 1, pm ≤ eSA ·e−SV . Then we bound SV and SA to have the upper bound
on pm. By Lemma 4, when u has Su ≤ 2i/233√n , every other node v has Sv ≤ 2
i/2+1
33
√
n
. Since
there is at most n nodes sending some identical messages, in which case |Am| ≤ n, and
with Sv ≤ 2i/2+133√n in mind, we have SA =
∑
v∈Am
Sv
2i
≤ n · 2i/2+1
33
√
n
/2i =
√
n
33·2i/2−1 . Put
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Figure 2.4: The structure of the argument for analyzing RC-CONSENSUS. The shaded
area indicates what has already been proved.
in i ≥ lg n + 6, SA ≤
√
n
33·2(lgn+6)/2−1 =
1
132
. For SV , we have SV =
∑
v∈V
Sv
2i
≥ 0.
Therefore, pm ≤ eSA · e−SV ≤ e132 .
In epoch i ≥ lg n+ 6, Su ≤ 2i/233√n ≤ 2
(lgn+6)/2
33
√
n
= 8/33. With the upper bound of pm,
we haveE[M ] ≤ pm Su d i ≤ e132 · 833 ·di ≤ 2edi1089 . For u to beome a helper in a repetition,
the number of identical messages M need to be di
128
. Let (1 + δ)E[M ] = di
128
, we have
δ = di
128
/ 2edi
1089
− 1 ≈ 0.565. By a Chernoff bound, the probability that u becomes a
helper is:
Pr(M >
di
128
) = Pr(M > (1 + δ)E[M ])
≤ e− δ
2E[M ]
3 Put in δ,E[M ]
≤ e− di1280
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Taking a union bound on n nodes, the probability that any node u becomes a helper
when Su ≤ 2i/233√n is e−
di
1280
+lnn = e−Ω(i) since i ≥ lg n+ 6. Therefore, by contradiction,
when some node u becomes a helper, Su ≥ 2i/233√n .
The next lemma proves that the adversary must incur significant cost in each repetition
in order to prevent nodes from successfully terminating.
Lemma 9. Every node u terminates in epoch i ≥ lg n+ 20 with high probability unless
the adversary jams at least bi2 lg n repetitions in epoch i, with each repetition having a
least a 1/4-fraction of its slots jammed.
Proof. By Lemma 7, with high probability, each node u is a helper holding the mini-
mum value at the end of a repetition where some node v doubles Sv when Sv ≥ 4
√
2i
n
.
Assume v is the first node who achieves Sv ≥ 4
√
2i
n
. Before v doubles Sv, each node
u is a helper. Hence, every node u has Su ≤ 4
√
2i
n
when u becomes a helper, and the
recorded value S ′u = Su when u becomes a helper is set as S
′
u ≤ 4
√
2i
n
.
We first note the following. By the pseudocode, u terminates when Su ≥ 132S ′u.
Since 132S ′u ≤ 520
√
2i
n
, when node u has Su ≥ 520
√
2i
n
, then umust have terminated.
By Lemma 2, when all nodes have Su ≤ 2i−1 ln (4q)n in a repetition in which q ≥ 1/4
(so it is not blocked), cu increments with high probability. Therefore, when Su ≤
520
√
2i
n
≤ 2i−1 ln (4q)
n
, cu increments in every repetition until u terminates. If the ad-
versary jams less than a 1/4-fraction of slots during a repetition in epoch i, we have
ln(4q) ≥ ln(4 · 3/4) > 1.09. We divide 2i−1 ln (4q)
n
over 520
√
2i
n
to compare them:
2i−1 ln(4q)
n
/520
√
2i
n
=
2i/2−1 ln(4q)
520
√
n
since i ≥ lg n+ 20 and ln(4q) > 1.09
≥ 2
lgn/2+9 · 1.09
520
√
n
since 2lgn/2 =
√
n and 29 · 1.09 > 520
> 1
Therefore, we have that 132S ′u ≤ 520
√
2i
n
≤ 2i−1 ln 4q
n
. It follows that, before any node
v has Sv ≥ 520
√
2i
n
and terminates, each node u must have Su ≤ 2i−1 ln 4qn .
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With less than bi2 lg n repetitions jammed, cu can increment at least (i − lg n)bi2
times and, therefore, Su is able to achieve 2i/n ≥ 2i−1 ln (4q)n . Consequently, the ad-
versary has to jam at least bi2 repetitions in epoch i, while each repetition has at least
1/4-fraction of slots jammed to prevent any node from termination in epoch i ≥ lg n +
20.
Finally, we wish to prove that a node only terminates once it has the correct (minimum)
value.
Lemma 10. All nodes receive the minimum value m0 before they terminate with high
probability.
Proof. By Lemma 8, if a node u becomes a helper with any message m, Su ≥ 2i/233√n .
Therefore, node u can terminate as soon as Su ≥ 132 · 2i/233√n ≥ 4
√
2i
n
. By Lemma 5,
the adversary must jam at least a 7/10-fraction of the slots in Θ(bi3) repetitions or
otherwise node u will achieve Su ≥ 4
√
2i
n
. When Su ≥ 4
√
2i
n
, by Lemma 7, with high
probability u is a helper holding the minimum value m0. Therefore, all nodes terminate
with the minimum value m0.
2.4 Proof for Theorem 1
In the previous section, we have proved that all nodes receive m0 with high probability.
Now we can give the proof for Theorem 1.
Proof. By Lemma 10, every node u achieves consensus with high probability. Then
we analysis the energy cost and time latency. By the pseudocode for RC-CONSENSUS,
a node u sends mu with probability Su/2i, and listens with probability of of Su d i/2i.
The cost in a repetition is the total time u sends messages or listens, and the expected
cost is 2i · (Su/2i + Sudi/2i) = O(Sui). Over bi3 repetitions in every epoch, the total
expected cost to a node u in epoch i is:
O(Sui · bi3) = O(Su i4) (2.5)
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By Lemma 10, Su = Θ(
√
2i/n). Therefore, the expected cost to a node u that termi-
nates in epoch i is:
O
(√
2i
n
· i4
)
(2.6)
In the case that there is no jamming on the channel, by Lemma 9, all nodes terminate
at epoch i = lg n+O(1). As a result,
√
2i
n
= O(1). By Lemma 3, no node u increments
cu with high probability. Therefore, using Equations 2.5 and 2.6, in epoch i ≤ lg(n) +
O(1), the cost for every node is O(i4). Summing the cost for each epoch, the total
expected cost for each node is
∑
i=1 lg(n) +O(1)O(i
4) = O(lg5 n). Therefore, we
have established our τ value for the resource-competitive analysis.
In the case of jamming, by Lemma 5 and Lemma 7, the adversary must jam at least
a 7/10-fraction of slots for at least bi3/2 repetitions in every epoch i ≥ lg n + 6 to
prevent some node u from getting the message. Assume the adversary performs such
jamming until epoch k. Then, the cost for the adversary is Ω(2k · k3).
By Lemma 9, with high probability, each node u terminates in epoch i ≥ lg n + 20
unless the adversary jams at least bi2 lg n repetitions in epoch i, where each repetition
has at least a 1/4-fraction of slots jammed. Assume the adversary jams until epoch k.
Then, the cost for the adversary is Ω(2k · k2 lg n).
Comparing the two costs to the advesrary, Ω(2k · k3) versus Ω(2k · k2 lg n), we take
the minimum of these to be T . And the cost (total number of time slots jammed) from
the adversary until epoch k is
T = Ω(2k · k2 lg n) (2.7)
By using this minimum cost from the adversary and Equation 2.6, the cost for each
node is O(
√
2k
n
· k4) = O(
√
2k·k2 lgn
n lgn
· lg3 n) = O(
√
T
n
· lg2.5 n). In terms of resource
competitiveness, we have established that ρ = O(
√
T
n
· lg2.5 n). Therefore, the total
expected cost for each node is T = O(
√
T
n
· lg2.5 n+ lg4 n).
Note that the above arguments are based on events that happen with high probability.
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There is still some small probability that some node u never hears any message and
never becomes a helper. Even though the probability of this event is low, if such a node
is allowed to execute forever, the expected cost would be infinite! Therefore, we use the
alternate termination condition that specifies that u halts when Su ≥ 520 · 2i/2.
By Lemma 7, all nodes are helpers when some node u doubles Su, resulting Su ≥
4
√
2i
n
. If u operates properly, with high probability u terminates when Su ≤ 132 ·
4
√
2i
n
≤ 520
√
2i
n
. Therefore, when Su ≥ 520 · 2i/2 > 520
√
2i
n
, u must an unlucky
node, and u terminates without reaching consensus. To prevent such unfortunate nodes
from terminating, the adversar must still jam a constant fraction of Θ(bi3) repetitions
in each epoch as described earlier. In this case, the expected cost incurred by u is
O(
√
2i/2 · i3 + √T · lg3 T ) = O(√n+ T lg3 n). Note that the case happens with
exceptionally low probability, the expected cost is still T = O(
√
T
n
· lg2.5 n+ lg4 n).
Finally, we analyze the time latency. Suppose a node u terminates in epoch j,
how many time slots have passed? In each epoch i, there are bi3 repetitions and each
repetition has 2i slots. Therefore, until epoch j, the total time slots are:
∑j
i=8
bi3 · 2i = Θ(j3 · 2j) (2.8)
By Lemma 9, with high probability, every node terminates in the first epoch exceeding
lg n + 20 where the adversary does not jam at least bi2 lg n repetitions, each with at
least a 1/4-fraction of slots jammed. Therefore, without jamming, all node terminate in
epoch lg n+O(1) with high probability. The expected latency in this case isO(n lg3 n).
In the case of jamming, assume the adversary jams until epoch k, by Equation 2.7 , the
number of time slots being jammed is T = Ω(lg n ·k2 ·2k). Therefore, by Equation 2.8,
the expected latency in the case of jamming is Θ(k3 · 2k) = Θ(lg n · k2 · 2k/ lg n) =
Θ(T · lg T/ lg n). Summing up both cases, the latency is Θ(T ·i/ lg n+n lg3 n). Finally,
the previously-mentioned unlucky node who never becomes a helper will terminate in
the same epoch as the other nodes, and the latency remains unchanged.
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3. Leader Election
In this section, we provide a solution to the leader-election problem which was
defined formally in Section 1.2.5. Informally, the goal is to have all nodes agree on a
single node prior to terminating. This aim of reaching agreement is an aspect that both
problems of consensus and leader election share in common.
Despite this similarity, a solution to the consensus problem does not directly yield
a solution to leader election. In the consensus problem, each node is initialized with an
arbitrary value. Indeed, there may be multiple nodes that possess the same value m. In
this case, it is perfectly valid for the nodes to agree on m. In contrast, leader election
requires that a unique node be agreed upon.
Of course, a consensus protocol could instruct nodes to append identifying infor-
mation (such as a port number and IP address) to their initial message. While filtering
on m, nodes could break ties simply by favoring the message with the smallest port
number (or IP address). Once a single value was agreed upon, the corresponding port
number and IP address would dictate the node to agreed upon as leader. Does this
revision work?
The problem with this proposed solution lies with the assumption that a unique la-
beling of the nodes already exists. First, relying on the existence of a pre-arranged
labeling of nodes limits the generality of the result. Second, devices may wish to select
labels that preserve privacy. For example, each node might select a numerical identi-
fier to use in a broadcast setting without the need for an intermediate router or switch
(obviating the need for routing information like ports and IP addresses).
How should we avoid relying on a pre-existing labeling? An natural attempt is to
have nodes select a numerical value uniformly at random. But from what range should
the node select if n is unknown? Without learning something about n, the chosen range
may be too small and two (or more) nodes may select the same label. Creating a labeling
of nodes on the fly poses a challenge that a leader-election must solve.
40
RC-LEADER-ELECTION for node u
tu ← participant
uid ← null
mu ← null
For each epoch i ≥ 8 do
• Su ← 1, cu ← 0
• Repeat bi3 times:
– For each of the 2i slots:
· Send mu with probability Su2i , if mu = null, send noise instead.
· Listen with probability Sudi
2i
.
– If more than Sudi
8
clear slots were detected, then do:
· cu ← cu + 1 and, if cu mod bi2 = 0, then Su ← 2Su.
· If Su ≥ 4 and uid = null, uid ← random[0, 22i]. If mu = null
or uid ≤ mu, mu ← uid.
– Execute one of the following:
· If Su ≥ 500 · 2i/2, then u terminates.
· If u hears m that is smaller than mu, then mu ← m and tu ←
participant.
· If tu = participant and mu is heard at least di128 times in a
repetition, then u← helper, S ′u = Su.
· If tu = helper and Su ≥ 132S ′u, then u terminates.
Figure 3.1: Pseudocode for RC-LEADER-ELECTION
3.1 Overview of the Algorithm
The pseudocode for our protocol RC-LEADER-ELECTION is specified in Figure 3.1.
The main body of the algorithm shares much in comment with RC-CONSENSUS. RC-
LEADER-ELECTION proceeds in epochs indexed by i ≥ 0. There are two parameters,
b > 0 and d > 0, which are sufficiently large constants. Each epoch contains bi3 repeti-
tions, and each repetition consists of 2i slots. Every node u has a status tu which is set to
participant at the beginning of each epoch. Depending on events that occur during
the epoch, tu can be set to participant or helper. After every node u terminates,
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the node v that has vid = mv is the selected leader. we describe these momentarily.
In order to overcome the labeling challenge discussed earlier, we introduce a mech-
anism for RC-LEADER-ELECTION that allows nodes to generate integer values uni-
formly at random from the range [0, 22i], where i is the current epoch. We will often
refer to such labels interchangeably as identifiers (IDs). So long as 2i is a good approx-
imation of n, then we can show that the probability that any two nodes share the same
ID is very small. Therefore, one of the critical aspects of our analysis is showing that
this approximation holds true.
Each node u maintains a value Su to determine the probability of sending and lis-
tening in each slot. Each node u also maintains two other values, uid and mu. The
value uid is node u’s unique identifier (ID) and mu represents the ID of the node who u
believes is the leader. Both values are null for every node at the start of the execution.
If uid = null and Su ≥ 4, u generates an ID for itself. After that, u compares the
uid with mu, and if mu = null or uid is smaller than mu, then u presents itself as the
potential leader and sets mu = uid. Prior to finding a potential leader (mu = null), u
will send noise whenever the algorithm dictates that u should transmit on the channel.
If mu = null and u hears an ID for the first time, or u hears any value smaller than the
current maintained mu, u sets mu to the minimum among the received values at the end
of that repetition. Once u has a non-null value for mu, then u will adopt lower values
that it hears and propagate this lower value as it would under our previous consensus
algorithm. When a node hearsmu a sufficient number of times, it then becomes a helper
node.
Once a node becomes a helper, we can show that every node u has an Su close
to the Goldilocks value. At this point, u has a constant probability of receiving a mes-
sage from other nodes in every unblocked repetition. Waiting a sufficient number of
unblocked repetitions guarantees that the smallest ID reaches all n nodes; however,
proving this requires a more nuanced approach. Recall that in Lemma 7 for RC-
CONSENSUS, all nodes have heard the minimum value at least once when some node u
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first achieves Su ≥ 4
√
2i
n
. However, that argument is based on the assumption that all
nodes have waited a sufficient amount of time prior to terminating. In RC-LEADER-
ELECTION, a node umay generate its own ID in some later epoch which means that the
duration of required waiting must be reassessed. In our arguments for correctness, we
borrow from our proofs in Chapter 2 and make revisions to show that nodes can safely
terminate under this situation.
3.2 Analysis of RC-LEADER-ELECTION
The structure of our proofs is provided in Figure 3.2. Since we are building upon RC-
CONSENSUS, there are several arguments from Chapter 2 that hold here without modi-
fication and we discuss this with more detail here.
The probabilities for sending and listening are the same for RC-CONSENSUS and RC-
LEADER-ELECTION. If a node u holds only a null value for mu, then u sends noise
in a time slot so that the fraction of the clear slots remains the same as in the case for
consensus. Therefore, Lemma 1 holds for RC-LEADER-ELECTION.
At the end of each repetition, u increments cu if more than Sudi8 clear slots were
detected. Using Lemma 1, we can again prove Lemma 2. Similarly, Lemma 3 is directly
proved by Lemma 1 since the terminations rule is identical. Lemmas 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9
are not dependent upon whether the message is unique; therefore they also continue to
hold for RC-LEADER-ELECTION.
For the remainder of this section, we focus on proving results that require at least
some revision from our previous analysis in Chapter 2. We must also introduce new
arguments to demonstrate correctness for our leader-election algorithm.
3.2.1 ID generation
We first argue that, with high probability, only unique values are generated when nodes
create their respective IDs.
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Figure 3.2: The analysis structure on RC-LEADER-ELECTION
Lemma 11. With high probability, only one node generates the minimum value.
Proof. By pseudocode, node u generates an ID when Su reaches 4 for the first time,
and u chooses a value from the range [0, 22i] where i is the current epoch. We want this
range to be sufficiently large such that, with high probability, no two nodes select the
same ID. To this end, we will show this range is at least [0, n2].
In epoch i ≤ lg n− 2, by the first claim of Lemma 3, no node u increments cu with
high probability. In epoch i = lg n− 1, by Equation 2.2, with high probability, the size
of Su is at most:
Su ≤ 2
i ln 12
n
≤ (1/2) ln 12 for i = lg n− 1
< 4
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Therefore, since Su < 4, node u must generate uid in some epoch i ≥ lg n with high
probability.
Assume that node u generates an ID with the minimum value. The probability that
some node v generates the same value is (1/2)2i ≤ 1/n2 since i ≥ lg n. Taking a
union bound over all n nodes, the probability that any two nodes generate the same
minimum value is at most n · 1/n2 = 1/n. Therefore, with high probability, only one
node generates an ID with the minimum value.
Next, we demonstrate a lower bound on the epoch index after which we are guaranteed
with high probability that each node u has generated uid.
Lemma 12. In epoch i ≥ lg n + 6, with high probability, when some node v achieves
Sv ≥
√
2i
n
, each node u has generated its respective uid.
Proof. Each node u generates an ID once Su ≥ 4. In epoch i ≥ lg n+ 6, it must be the
case that a node v has Sv ≥
√
2i
n
≥
√
2lgn+6
n
= 8. By Lemma 4, with high probability
every node u must have Su ≥ (1/2)Sv ≥ 4. Therefore, with high probability, every
node u generates its ID when some node v achieves Sv ≥
√
2i
n
.
3.2.2 Message propagation
In this section, we address the propagation of the minimum value. The bulk of our argu-
ments mirror those in Chapter 2. However, some revisions are necessary and, therefore,
we include the entire proof for completeness.
Lemma 13. In a repetition in epoch i ≥ lg n + 6, when some node v first achieves
Sv ≥ 4
√
2i
n
, every node u is a helper and mu = m0.
Proof. When some node v first achieves Sv ≥ 2
√
2i
n
in repetition j1, by Lemma 4,
every node u has Su ≥
√
2i
n
. By Lemma 12, with high probability every node u has
generated its ID. By Lemma 11, with high probability, there is only one node u0 that
generates the minimum value m0.
45
Pessimistically, assume that some node v just generates vid with the minimum value
at the beginning of a repetition when some node w (v and w may or may not be the
same node) first achieves Sv ≥ 2
√
2i
n
. In this case, only v alone knows the supposed
leader in that repetition and only v holdsm0. Then we follow the proof of Lemma 7. By
Lemma 6, with high probability, at most logi/4 n − 1 unblocked repetitions are needed
to achieve |A| ≥ n/i, and then at most eight more unblocked repetition for |A| = n.
In other words, with high probability, at most logi/4 n + 7 unblocked repetitions are
required for |A| = n.
For a node u, each time that Su doubles, it must be that cu has incremented at least
bi2 times since the previous time that Su doubled. In addition, the incrementing of cu
occurs at most once per repetition. If at the end of repetition j1 in epoch i, some node
v doubles Sv such that 2
√
2i/n ≤ Sv < 4
√
2i/n, by Lemma 4, every other node u has
Su ≥ (1/2)Sv ≥
√
2i/n.
Now consider a repetition j2 ≥ j1 in same epoch i where the mentioned node v
doubles its Sv again so that Sv ≥ 4
√
2i/n. It follows that j2 − j1 ≥ bi2; otherwise,
Su cannot have doubled. By Lemma 2, with high probability, each node u does not
increment cu in an blocked repetition. Therefore, whenever some node u increments
cu in a repetition, the repetition should be unblocked. Hence, if this event happens in
repetition j2, there are at least bi2 unblocked repetitions.
As argued above, at most logi/4 n+ 4 unblocked repetitions are needed for |A| = n.
By Lemma 3, i ≥ lg n + 6. Additionally, assume i ≥ 8. It follows that logi/4 n + 4 ≤
lg n+ 4 < bi2. Therefore, with high probability, bi2 repetitions are sufficiently large to
achieve |A| = n. Consequently, when any node u has 2√2i/n ≤ Su ≤ 4√2i/n and
then doubles Su, all nodes have heard m0 at least once with high probability.
Now that all nodes hold m0, we examine whether each node will become a helper
in an unblocked repetition. Since every non-terminated node is sending m0, it follows
that SA = SV =
∑
v∈V (Sv/2
i). By Lemma 1 and using SA = SV , pm ≥ SV · e−2SV .
To get a lower bound on pm, we derive a lower bound for both SV and e−2SV . By
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Lemma 2, every node w has 2
√
2i/n ≤ Sw < 8
√
2i/n. By Lemma 4, we know that
i ≥ lg n + 6. Consequently, 8√n/2i ≤ 8√n/2lgn+6 = 1, and SV < 8√n/2i ≤
1. Therefore, using this inequality for SV and e−2SV , we have pm ≥ SV · e−2SV ≥
2e−2
√
n
2i
.
What is the expected number of times m0 is heard by a node w in a repetition of
epoch i? Let binary random variable Mj = 1 if w receives m0 in slot j of an unblocked
repetition; otherwise, let Mj = 0. Define M =
∑2i
j=1Mj . Noting that Pr(Mj = 1) ≥
pm q Sw di/2
i, we have E[M ] ≥∑2ij=1 E[Mj] = pm q Sw d i by linearity of expectation.
When the repetition is unblocked, we have the following:
E[M ] ≥ pm q Sw d i
≥
(
2e−2
√
n
2i
)
q Sw d i by plugging in the lower bound on pm
≥
(
2e−2
√
n
2i
) (
1
12
)
Sw d i since q ≥ 1/12 in an unblocked repetition
≥
(
2e−2
√
n
2i
) (
1
12
) (
2
√
2i
n
)
d i by the lower bound on Sw
≥ d i
3e2
>
di
128
Therefore, node w expects to hear enough messages to exceed the threshold to be a
helper. Using Theorem 3 with δ = d i
3e2
/ di
128
= 0.83, using a standard Chernoff bound
yields:
Pr
(
M <
di
128
)
= Pr (M < (1− 0.83)E[M ])
≤ e− 0.83
2di
2·128
≤ e− di371
≤ e−Ω(i)
Therefore, with a sufficiently large constant d > 0, all nodes are helpers with the iden-
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tical message m0 with high probability. Taking a union bound on n nodes, the prob-
ability that every node u becomes a helper is n · e−Ω(i) = e−Ω(i)+lgn = e−Ω(i) since
i ≥ lg n+ 6.
3.2.3 Reaching Termination
Finally, we analyze the termination component of our algorithm. Here, we must show
that, with high probability, all nodes eventually terminate (i.e. once the adversary stops
jamming aggressively) and that they are in agreement on the leader prior to this termi-
nation.
Lemma 14. With high probability, all nodes pick the same leader before they terminate.
Proof. By Lemma 3, with high probability, no node terminates when i < lg n + 6. As
a result, we need only consider the case where i ≥ lg n + 6. By Lemma 11, with high
probability, only one node generates the minimum value. By Lemma 13, when some
node v achieves Sv ≥ 4
√
2i
n
, every node u should be a helper with the minimum ID m0
with high probability. Therefore, if every node u terminates after Su ≥ 4
√
2i
n
, u should
pick the same leader.
By Lemma 5, the adversary must jam at least a 7/10-fraction of the slots in Ω(bi2)
repetitions; otherwise, node u will achieve an Su that exceeds 4
√
2i
n
. Would u able
to terminate before Su ≥ 4
√
2i
n
? By Lemma 8, if a node u becomes a helper with any
messagem, Su ≥ 2i/233√n . It follows that u can terminate as early as its Su ≥ 132 · 2
i/2
33
√
n
≥
4
√
2i
n
. Therefore, all nodes terminate after Su ≥ 4
√
2i
n
, then they should terminate with
the minimum value m0, and they pick the same leader w whose wid = m0.
3.3 Proof for Theorem 2
Putting the above arguments together, we now give the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof. By Lemma 14, with high probability, every node u selects the same leader before
it terminates. The correctness of our solution to leader election is established. We now
focus on analyzing the expected cost and latency.
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The probabilities that u sends or listens in a slot, and the rule for increasing Su, are
identical to that specified in RC-CONSENSUS. Consequently, we make use of Equa-
tions 2.5 and 2.6 and restate them here. The cost for any node u in epoch i (Equation
2.5) is:
O(Sui · b i3) = O(Su · i4)
The cost for any node u in epoch i and u terminates in the same epoch (Equation 2.6)
is:
O
(√
2i
n
· i4
)
In the case that there is no jamming on the channel, by Lemma 9, all nodes terminate
at epoch i = lg n+O(1). As a result,
√
2i
n
= O(1). By Lemma 3, no node u increments
cu with high probability. Therefore, using Equations 2.5 and 2.6, in epoch i ≤ lg(n) +
O(1), the cost for every node is O(i4). Summing the cost for each epoch, the total
expected cost for each node is
∑
i=1 lg(n) +O(1)O(i
4) = O(lg5 n). Therefore, we
have established our τ value for the resource-competitive analysis.
In the case of jamming, by Lemma 5 and Lemma 13, the adversary must jam at
least a 7/10-fraction of slots for at least bi3/2 repetitions in every epoch i ≥ lg n+ 6 to
prevent some node u from getting the message. Assume the adversary performs such
jamming until epoch k, the cost for the adversary is Ω(2k · k3).
By Lemma 9, with high probability, each node u terminates in epoch i ≥ lg n + 20
unless the adversary jams at least bi2 lg n repetitions in epoch i, where each repetition
has at least a 1/4-fraction of slots jammed. Assume the adversary jams until epoch k.
Then, the cost for the adversary is Ω(2k · k2 lg n).
Comparing the two costs to the advesrary, Ω(2k · k3) versus Ω(2k · k2 lg n), we take
the minimum of these to be T . And the cost (total number of time slots jammed) from
the adversary, same as Equation 2.7, is:
T = Ω(2k · k2 lg n)
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By using this minimum cost from the adversary and Equation 2.6, the cost for each
node is O(
√
2k
n
· k4) = O(
√
2k·k2 lgn
n lgn
· lg3 n) = O(
√
T
n
· lg2.5 n). In terms of resource
competitiveness, we have established that ρ = O(
√
T
n
· lg2.5 n). Therefore, the total
expected cost for each node is T = O(
√
T
n
· lg2.5 n+ lg4 n).
Note that the above arguments are based on events that happen with high probability.
There is still some small probability that some node u never hears any message and
never becomes a helper. Even though the probability of this event is low, if such a node
is allowed to execute forever, the expected cost would be infinite! Therefore, we use the
alternate termination condition that specifies that u halts when Su ≥ 520 · 2i/2.
By Lemma 13, all nodes are helpers when some node u doubles Su, resulting Su ≥
4
√
2i
n
. If u operates properly, with high probability u terminates when Su ≤ 132 ·
4
√
2i
n
≤ 520
√
2i
n
. Therefore, when Su ≥ 520 · 2i/2 > 520
√
2i
n
, u must an unlucky
node, and u terminates without reaching consensus. To prevent such unfortunate nodes
from terminating, the adversar must still jam a constant fraction of Θ(bi3) repetitions
in each epoch as described earlier. In this case, the expected cost incurred by u is
O(
√
2i/2 · i3 + √T · lg3 T ) = O(√n+ T lg3 n). Note that the case happens with
exceptionally low probability, the expected cost is still T = O(
√
T
n
· lg2.5 n+ lg4 n).
Finally, we analyze the time latency. As in each epoch the number of repetitions
and the number of slots in each repetition from RC-LEADER-ELECTION are identical
to RC-CONSENSUS, we make use of the time latency Equation 2.8. Until epoch j, the
total time slots are: ∑j
i=8
bi3 · 2i = Θ(j3 · 2j)
By Lemma 9, with high probability, every node terminates in the first epoch after lg n+
20 where the adversary does not jam at least bi2 lg n repetitions in epoch i ≥ lg n+ 20,
where each repetition has at least a 1/4-fraction of slots jammed. Therefore, without
jamming, all node terminate in epoch lg n + O(1) with high probability. The expected
latency in this case is O(n lg3 n). In the case of jamming, assume the adversary jams
until epoch k, by Equation 2.7 , the number of time slots being jammed is T = Ω(lg n ·
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k2 · 2k). Therefore, by Equation 2.8, the cost in the case of jamming is Θ(k3 · 2k) =
Θ(lg n · k2 · 2k/ lg n) = Θ(T · lg T/ lg n). Sum up the both case, the time latency is
Θ(T · i/ lg n + n lg3 n). For the unlucky node who never becomes a helper, which is
mentioned in previous, it would terminate in same epoch as others, and the time latency
is same.
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4. Discussion
We have provided resource-competitive algorithms for the consensus and leader
election problems in a single-hop wireless network that tolerate a 1-uniform adaptive
adversary. In this section, we first discuss several practical considerations regarding our
results and we pose a handful of avenues for extending this work. We then consider is-
sues related to our expected-cost analysis, and whether stronger statements are possible
that would impact performance. Finally, we pose more general open problems as topics
for future research in this area.
Energy Costs. The wireless network cards onboard WSN devices offer states such as
sleep, listen and send. Surprisingly, the cost of the send and listen states are roughly
equivalent and dominate the operating cost of a device; hence, our normalized unit costs
for both sending and listening seem appropriate. In contrast, the sleep state requires
negligible power. For example, the send and listen costs for a modern Telos mote are
38mW and 35mW, respectively and the sleep state cost is 15µW [48].
In the future, it may be of interest to consider different transmission strengths, and
their respective costs. Being able to transmit at a higher strength may permit nodes
to overcome jamming attacks in a different fashion than we have considered in this
document.
Model of Communication. The process of clear-channel assessment (CCA) utilizes a
hardware component known as the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) [55]. For
a RSSI value that is below a specified clear-channel threshold, the channel is assumed
to be not in use [10]. However, this measurement may not always correctly indicate the
status of the channel. For example, if the clear-channel threshold is set too low, then
the corresponding device will assume the channel as busy when, in fact, this is not the
case. Conversely, for a threshold set too high, the device will assume the channel is
clear when it is not.
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It is apparent that the threshold setting has an impact on the performance of our al-
gorithms since the ability to count the number of clear slots is important. An interesting
question for future work is whether one can employ more detailed models of wireless
communication to incorporate this additional aspect.
Fault Models. In the interest of designing robust wireless sensor networks, future
work should address other types of faults in addition to jamming attacks. For exam-
ple, devices may suffer crash failures, and our current results may not tolerate such
faults. In particular, if crash failures occur randomly, our results can likely be shown
to hold. However, in the case of an adversary who engineers a worst-case sequence of
crashes — perhaps by repeatedly targeting nodes that have most recently received the
minimum value — it may be impossible to achieve consensus quickly.
In addition to crash failures, tolerating Byzantine faults is an interesting open prob-
lem. If a node suffers a Byzantine fault, it may deviate arbitrarily from a specified
protocol; for example, it may inject malicious messages into the system in addition to
jamming. An example of an attack is that such an adversary may perpetually reset the
minimum value by injecting messages of smaller and smaller value. Such an attack
would stymie agreement and new ideas are needed to address such an adversary.
Finally, handling an adversary that is reactive is an interesting open problem. A
reactive adversary poses a greater challenge and it seems that the approach described
in [36] may offer a starting point for tackling this problem.
Can Cryptography Help? Our consensus and leader-election algorithms do not ad-
dress situations where messages may be spoofed. However, if we assume that messages
are signed and can be authenticated — perhaps through some form of public-key cryp-
tography — then it may be possible to tolerate the injection of malicious messages.
More generally, since jamming is a denial-of-service attack in the wireless domain,
cryptography does not seem to offer much in terms of overcoming the type of attacks
that we have addressed in this document. A possible strategy that could further improve
things is to have nodes share and agree upon a schedule of sending and listening. Such
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a schedule would reduce the communication costs for nodes while making it harder for
the adversary to jam effectively.
However, if we assume that the adversary can listen for free (and we have not been
charging the adversary for this), then such a schedule will always be overheard by the
adversary and rendered useless. Therefore, an interesting avenue of future work is
investigate a model where the adversary incurs a cost for listening, and where nodes
attempt to share a secret schedule.
Performance in Practice. While our results are promising, it seems clear that optimiz-
ing the constants would be necessary to achieve good performance in practice. In our
current analysis, there is a large constant factor inside the running time and energy cost
results. For example, in the proof of Lemma 9, we demonstrated that the adversary must
jam significantly after epoch lg n + 20 to prevent nodes from terminating. Therefore,
even without jamming we cannot guarantee that nodes terminate with high probability
before epoch i = lg n+ 20. This translates into a total number of time slots of 220, even
if n = 2.
Without optimizing the the constants in our results, the algorithm may operate
poorly in practice. Such optimization would likely lead to a less-readable set of argu-
ments;. However, we believe that significantly smaller constants are possible, and it is
of interest to know how these algorithms perform either in practice or under large-scale
simulations.
4.1 Exceeding the Expected Cost
Our algorithms have been analyzed with respect to expected cost. In this section, we
discuss the probabilitiy that any node deviates by any considerable amount from this
expected cost. We will show that each node can use its own internal pseudo-random
number generator to inform its decisions in every execution of the algorithm, and that
with probability at least 1− 1/nΘ(lg4 n), no node exceeds its expected cost by two.
To better study this problem, we assume that there is an adversary who jams the
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channel in such a way no node ever terminates. Note that we do not describe the actual
jamming strategy used to accomplish this (or even whether it is expensive for the adver-
sary); we only assume the jamming is sufficient to prevent any node from terminating.
Furthermore, during the execution of the algorithm (either RC-CONSENSUS or RC-
LEADER-ELECTION), Su values for each node u may or may not grow in each epoch i;
for this, we define a new variable Sui ≥ 1 to be the upper bound on Su in epoch i; that
is, Su never exceeds Sui in epoch i.
Given this setup, we calculate the probability that a node u incurs too much energy
than the expectation over any epoch i ≥ lg n. If this probability is sufficiently small,
then we have shown that the actual cost rarely deviates from the expectation.
For node u, define the binary random variable Xi,l such that Xi,l = 1 if u sends or
listens in slot l of epoch i; Xi,l = 0 otherwise. Then Xi =
∑bi3·2i
l=1 Xi,l denotes the total
cost incurred by node u in epoch i.
In epoch i, u’s expected cost is E[Xi] ≤ bi3 · (Suidi+ Sui) ≤ b(d+ 1)Suii4. Define
another random variable Yi =
∑i
j=1E[Xj] to represent the total cost incurred by u up
until epoch i, inclusive. Suppose node u incurs a cost that is a 1 + δ-factor larger than
the expected cost, where δ ≥ 1 is a constant. By a Chernoff bound, the probability that
this event occurs is:
Pr(Yi > (1 + δ)E[Yi]) ≤ e−
E[Yi]
3
≤ e−
δ2
∑i
j=1 b(d+1)Sujj
4
3 using Yi =
∑i
j=1E[Xj]
and E[Xj] ≤ b(d+ 1)Suj j4
≤ e−
δ2b(d+1)
∑i
j=1 j
4
3 since Suj ≥ 1
≤ e−Θ(i5) since∑ij=1 j4 = Θ(∫ i1 j4dj) = Θ(i5)
where this probability can be driven down arbitrarily so long as b and/or d are suffi-
ciently large constants. By Lemma 3, no node terminates in epoch i ≤ lg n + 6. Let
δ = 1 and take a union bound over all n nodes and every epoch i ≥ lg n+6. This yields
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that the probability that any node u incurs a cost exceeding two times its expected cost
is:
n
∞∑
i=lgn+6
Pr(Xi > (1 + δ)E[Yi]) ≤ n
∞∑
i=lgn+6
e−Θ(i
5)
For i ≥ lg n + 6, it is true that i · lg4 n ≤ i5. As a result, ∑∞i=lgn+6 e−Θ(i5) ≤∑∞
i=lgn+6 e
−Θ(i·lg4 n) =
∑∞
i=lgn+6(e
−Θ(lg4 n))i, which we can use to reduce the function
into a geometric series. Therefore, we have:
n
∞∑
i=lgn+6
Pr(Xi > (1 + δ)E[Yi]) ≤ n
∞∑
i=lgn+6
(e−Θ(lg
4 n))i by geometric series
≤ n · 1/eΘ(lg5 n)
≤ 1/nΘ(lg4 n)−1
≤ 1/nΘ(lg4 n)
Therefore, the probability that any node u incurs more than two times of expectation is
less than 1/nΘ(lg
4 n) in a single execution. Note that this is the probability over an infinite
execution; thus, one would need to carry out a super-polynomial number of executions
before expecting to see an execution where nodes deviate by more than a constant from
their expected cost. The implications of this result are that the performance of nodes in
practice should be tightly bound to the expected-cost guarantees that we have provided
in our earlier analysis.
4.2 Additional Future Work
A general open problem revolves around the issue of synchronization. In our al-
gorithms, we assume that all devices start in the same slot with the same epoch index.
However, in practice, such synchronization may not be practical due to clock drift or
devices participating in the network at different times. For example, what if we allow
new devices to join dynamically?
Another important open problem addresses the structure of the wireless network.
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Our current model is a single-hop wireless network where every device can send to and
hear from all other devices. However, in practice, large networks will require multiple
hops to route information. Therefore, an interesting challenge is whether we can adapt
our current work to deal with the multi-hop case. In a such model, we are dealing with
a possible n-uniform jamming adversary, as an adversary can jam every different areas
by positioning a malicious device in each portion of the network.
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